T1547.005sub-technique of T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Security Support Provider

Windowsnothing on this site yetT1547.005 on attack.mitre.org

Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.

MITRE ATT&CK 19.2, retrieved 2026-09-12

If this is happening now

2

Checklists and playbooks to open while the alert is still live.

Playbook for this stage

Cloud account compromise

Impossible travel, an unrecognised inbox rule, or a reported invoice-fraud attempt.

how MITRE says to see it

Registry and LSASS Monitoring for Security Support Provider Abuse

  • Monitor registry modifications to `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages` or `...\OSConfig\Security Packages`, especially insertions of new DLL entries. Correlate this with subsequent DLL module loads into `lsass.exe`. Track unsigned or anomalous DLLs loading into LSASS using image load auditing.

what reduces it

  • M1025 Privileged Process Integrity. Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL`, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft.

the rest of T1547

The description, detection analytics and mitigations are reproduced from MITRE ATT&CK, version 19.2, under its terms of use. The checklists, hunts, labs and everything else linked here are this site’s.