T1036.005sub-technique of T1036 Masquerading

Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

Containers · ESXi · Linux · macOS · Windowsnothing on this site yetT1036.005 on attack.mitre.org

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: `svchost.exe`).

MITRE ATT&CK 19.2, retrieved 2026-09-12

how MITRE says to see it

Detection Strategy for Masquerading via Legitimate Resource Name or Location

  • Detects processes or binaries executed from trusted directories (e.g., System32) or using trusted names (e.g., svchost.exe) where the metadata, hash, or parent process does not align with legitimate activity patterns.
  • Detects renamed binaries or scripts placed into trusted paths like /usr/bin or /lib with mismatched metadata or unexpected creation/modification times.
  • Detects binaries or launch daemons in /System/Library or /Applications with mismatched bundle names, unexpected metadata, or improper installation origin.
  • Detects malicious containers or pods using names, labels, or namespaces that mimic legitimate workloads; also checks for image layer mismatches and unauthorized resource deployments.

what reduces it

  • M1038 Execution Prevention. Use tools that restrict program execution via application control by attributes other than file name for common operating system utilities that are needed.
  • M1045 Code Signing. Require signed binaries and images.
  • M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as `C:\Windows\System32`.

the rest of T1036

The description, detection analytics and mitigations are reproduced from MITRE ATT&CK, version 19.2, under its terms of use. The checklists, hunts, labs and everything else linked here are this site’s.