T1574.014sub-technique of T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
AppDomainManager
Windowsnothing on this site yetT1574.014 on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking how the.NET `AppDomainManager` loads assemblies. The.NET framework uses the `AppDomainManager` class to create and manage one or more isolated runtime environments (called application domains) inside a process to host the execution of.NET applications. Assemblies (`.exe` or `.dll` binaries compiled to run as.NET code) may be loaded into an application domain as executable code.
If this is happening now
Checklists and playbooks to open while the alert is still live.
Playbook for this stage
Suspicious execution on an endpoint
An EDR alert, an unexplained process, or a user reporting something odd.
how MITRE says to see it
Detection Strategy for Hijack Execution Flow through the AppDomainManager on Windows.
- Detection focuses on unauthorized manipulation of.NET AppDomainManager behavior. Defenders may observe suspicious creation of new AppDomains within trusted processes, anomalous loading of assemblies via non-standard configuration files, or registry/environment variable changes redirecting AppDomainManager to malicious...
what reduces it
- M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions. Install.NET applications and related software in write-protected locations. Set directory access controls to prevent file writes to the search paths for.NET applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard resources folders.
the rest of T1574
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1574.004 Dylib Hijacking
- T1574.005 Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
- T1574.006 Dynamic Linker Hijacking
- T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
- T1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
- T1574.009 Path Interception by Unquoted Path
- T1574.010 Services File Permissions Weakness
- T1574.011 Services Registry Permissions Weakness
- T1574.012 COR_PROFILER
- T1574.013 KernelCallbackTable