T1526

Cloud Service Discovery

IaaS · Identity Provider · Office Suite · SaaS1 piece on this siteT1526 on attack.mitre.org

An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc.

MITRE ATT&CK 19.2, retrieved 2026-09-12

The evidence it leaves

1

Where the traces live, and what each source proves and does not.

how MITRE says to see it

Detection Strategy for Cloud Service Discovery

  • Unusual enumeration of services and resources through cloud APIs such as AWS CLI `describe-*`, Azure Resource Manager queries, or GCP project listings. Defender perspective includes anomalous API calls, unexpected volume of service enumeration, and correlation of discovery with recently compromised sessions.
  • Enumeration of directories, applications, or service principals through APIs such as Microsoft Graph or Okta API. Defender perspective includes unexpected listing of users, roles, applications, and abnormal access to identity management endpoints.
  • Discovery of SaaS services connected to productivity platforms (e.g., Microsoft 365, Google Workspace). Defender perspective includes unexpected enumeration of enabled services, API integrations, or OAuth applications tied to user accounts.
  • Discovery of connected SaaS applications, APIs, or configurations within platforms like Salesforce, Slack, or Zoom. Defender perspective includes enumeration of available integrations, abnormal querying of service metadata, and follow-on attempts to exploit or persist via discovered services.

The description, detection analytics and mitigations are reproduced from MITRE ATT&CK, version 19.2, under its terms of use. The checklists, hunts, labs and everything else linked here are this site’s.