T1204

User Execution

Linux · Windows · macOS · IaaS · Containers8 pieces on this siteT1204 on attack.mitre.org

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.

MITRE ATT&CK 19.2, retrieved 2026-09-12

If this is happening now

3

Checklists and playbooks to open while the alert is still live.

First-hour playbookMembers

A remote access tool nobody installed

AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer, Atera, Splashtop or something like them appears on a host where IT does not use it, or a sanctioned tool connects to an account or relay you do not own.

T1204.002

The evidence it leaves

5

Where the traces live, and what each source proves and does not.

how MITRE says to see it

User Execution – multi-surface behavior chain (documents/links → helper/unpacker → LOLBIN/child → egress)

  • Cause→effect chain: (1) User-facing app (Office/PDF/archiver/browser) records an open/click or abnormal event, then (2) a downloaded file is created in a user-writable path and/or decompressed, (3) the parent user app spawns a living-off-the-land binary (e.g., powershell/cmd/mshta/rundll32/msiexec/wscript/expand/zip)...
  • Cause→effect chain: (1) User app/browser/archiver logs an open/click or abnormal exit, (2) new executable/script/archive extracted into $HOME/Downloads, /tmp, or ~/.cache, (3) parent app spawns shell/interpreter (bash/sh/python/node/curl/wget) or desktop file, and (4) new outbound connection(s) from the child lineage.
  • Cause→effect chain: (1) unified logs show application open/click or crash for Safari/Chrome/Office/Preview/archiver, (2) file write/extraction into ~/Downloads, /private/var/folders/* or ~/Library, (3) parent app spawns osascript/bash/zsh/curl/python or opens a quarantined app with Gatekeeper prompts, (4) network...
  • Cause→effect chain in CI/dev desktops: (1) user triggers container run/pull after opening a doc/link/script, (2) newly created image/container uses unexpected external registry or entrypoint, (3) container starts and immediately egresses to suspicious destinations.

what reduces it

  • M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention. If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity.
  • M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content. If a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as.scr,.exe,.pif,.cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious files.
  • M1033 Limit Software Installation. Where possible, consider requiring developers to pull from internal repositories containing verified and approved packages rather than from external ones.
  • M1017 User Training. Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events.
  • M1038 Execution Prevention. Application control may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.
  • M1040 Behavior Prevention on Endpoint. On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criteria and to prevent Office applications from creating potentially malicious executable content by blocking malicious code from being written to disk. Note: cloud-delivered protection must be enabled to use certain rules.

sub-techniques

The description, detection analytics and mitigations are reproduced from MITRE ATT&CK, version 19.2, under its terms of use. The checklists, hunts, labs and everything else linked here are this site’s.