T1027.011sub-technique of T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
Fileless Storage
Linux · Windowsnothing on this site yetT1027.011 on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.
how MITRE says to see it
Detection Strategy for Fileless Storage via Registry, WMI, and Shared Memory
- Detects abuse of fileless storage mechanisms such as Registry keys, WMI classes, and Event Logs used to stage payloads, scripts, or encoded content outside traditional files.
- Detects usage of shared memory directories (/dev/shm, /run/shm) for temporary storage of obfuscated, encoded, or executable data without persistence to disk.
what reduces it
- M1047 Audit. Consider periodic review of common fileless storage locations (such as the Registry or WMI repository) to potentially identify abnormal and malicious data.
the rest of T1027
- T1027.001 Binary Padding
- T1027.002 Software Packing
- T1027.003 Steganography
- T1027.004 Compile After Delivery
- T1027.005 Indicator Removal from Tools
- T1027.006 HTML Smuggling
- T1027.007 Dynamic API Resolution
- T1027.008 Stripped Payloads
- T1027.009 Embedded Payloads
- T1027.010 Command Obfuscation
- T1027.012 LNK Icon Smuggling
- T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1027.014 Polymorphic Code
- T1027.015 Compression
- T1027.016 Junk Code Insertion
- T1027.017 SVG Smuggling
- T1027.018 Invisible Unicode