Archive
Incident teardowns, detection engineering, reverse engineering and network forensics.
The half of an intrusion that survives rebuilding the endpoint. Tokens, consent grants, federation and the logs that are not retained by default.
An operational technology jump host, a shared engineering account, and a change nobody will own. Every log works, every timestamp is right, and attribution is still impossible. Work out what that costs, and what you would have needed to collect to make a name provable.
A supplier is out €96,000 and the only endpoint that mattered was wiped on day one, by a helpdesk following the documented process correctly. Here is every artefact that still exists. Work out what you can prove, what you can only say is consistent, and the one collection change that would have moved the most from the second column to the first.
Four Sigma rules for the cloud identity attacks that actually land: illicit consent grants, authentication methods added after a risky sign-in, help-desk MFA resets, and session tokens replayed from a second address.
A business email compromise where the obvious finding is a decoy. Ninety minutes on Microsoft 365 audit logs, OAuth consent grants, and why resetting the password does not end this incident.
A constructed intrusion written as a DFIR report. You get the same artifacts an analyst gets on day one, in the order they arrive, and you build the timeline yourself. The company is fictional; the techniques, event IDs and analytic reasoning are not.
